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THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY ON ECONOMIC GROWTH:
EVIDENCE FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Uisoon Kwon, M.A.
Western Michigan Universi_ty, 1997
This thesis examined the impact of political instability on economic growth.

This thesis included forty

three developing countries and employed multiple regression analysis.

First,

Three hypotheses were tested.

cross-nationally, political instability may serve to decrease the availability of factors of production.
ond,

cross-nationally,

political

crease the quantity of labor.

instability

Third,

will

Secde-

cross-nationally,

political instability may negatively influence the timing
and organization of the production process.
The statistical results of multiple regression were
not significant at .05 level using t-test.
null hypotheses were not rejected.

Therefore the

Based on statistical

results, possible reasons for the statistical insignifi
cance were considered in terms of both theoretically and
methodologically.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Economic growth or development has been a major issue to the less developed countries.

Nevertheless, eco-

nomic development in those countries with a few exceptions has not been very successful.

It has been widely

accepted that there are links between political and economic development.

Lasting economic development is un-

thinkable without a certain amount of political and legal
order; conversely, economic development can contribute to
the stabilization of a political system.

However, eco-

nomic success or development "cannot by itself safeguard
the survival of a regime" (Berg-Schlosser
p.1).

&

Siegler 1990,

Economic development has been studied in various

dimensions including its relationship with democracy and
political instability.
The subject of economic development or growth has
been examined by many political scientists in the context
of

compatibility

with

democracy.

Weede's

approach

clearly represents the tendency of the study of economic
growth and democracy.

He says,

Since growth and democracy are two analytically
distinguishable goals, the task of social sci
ence research is to find out whether and under
which circumstances and to what degree these
1

2

goals
p. 21)

are

compatible

or

incompatible

(1983,

These studies focus on how democracy or types of regimes influence economic growth.

Those who have studied

economic development in the context of its relationship
with democracy have found that there is a negative rela
tionship

between

democracy

and

economic

development

(Weede, 1983; Chan, 1994)or even no relationship between
them.

(Przeworski and Limongi,

1995; Roemer,

1995).

In

his article, The Impact of Democracy on Economic Growth,
Weede

(1983) finds that democracy has been a burden for

economic growth
(LDCs)

However,

especially in Less

Developed Countries

he argues that the negative impact of

democracy on growth is too small to serve as an excuse
for authoritarianism, neglect of human rights or repres
sion in the name of economic progress.
Recently, Przeworski and Limongi (1995) examined the
impact of type of regime on economic growth.

They find

no evidence that democracy or type of regime fosters or
hinders economic growth.
do

not

capture

the

Instead, they find that regimes

relevant

differences

in

growth while politics in general does matter.
to them,

economic
According

"it does not seem to be democracy or authori

tarianism per se that makes the difference, but something
else... What that something else might be is far from
clear" (1995, p.16)

This indicates that we need to em-
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ploy other possible determinants of economic growth in
politics as they suggest that politics do matter.
On the other hand, economic growth has been studied
as a determining factor that possibly influences politi
cal instability in the form of political conflict and po
litical violence.

In this case, economic growth has been

treated as a maj or determinant of political conflict or
violence.
Contrary to the predictions of modernization theo
rists,

economic development has not contributed to po

litical stability in the Third World.

Rather, it has led

to political violence or conflict. Rapid economic growth
caused a gap between the valued things and opportunities
people feel entitled to and the things and opportunities
they actually get. According to Gurr (1970), the gap cre
ates relative deprivation through the people and the psy
chological status of relative deprivation is the maj or
source of political violence.

Other studies also show

that there is a positive relationship between economic
growth

and

political

( 1963) indicates,
rapid,

violence.

Especially,

as

Olson

when the rate of economic growth is

the positive relationship between economic growth

and political instability becomes strong.
Many studies have begun to examine the sources of
economic development.

It has been widely accepted that

political stability has a link to economic development.

4

The conventional wisdom assumes that political stability
is

a

prerequisite

Turner, 1966).

for

economic

development

(Holt

and

According to Huntington (1968), domestic

order is a necessary condition for economic growth.

The

importance of political stability in economic growth can
Political instability

also be found in recent studies.

has been identified as one of the most important obsta
cles to economic and human development (Mbaku 1992; Fosu,
1992)).
However,

the relationship between political insta

bility and economic development has received little em
pirical attention, due in large part to the lack of data
on political stability (Fosu, 1992).

In the article pub

lished in 1987, Goldsmith asserts that political stability influences other important socioeconomic processes.
Nevertheless,

he argues,

little empirical research has

treated political stability as an independent variable
As indicated

(1987)

above,

some

significant

studies

about the relationship between political stability and
economic development specify political stability as a de
pendent variable.

Goldsmith (1987) suggests two reasons

for the lack of research on the independent effects of
political stability.

He says

II

most scholars hold

stability to be intrinsically valuable and thus are not
drawn

to

study

its

effects

as

rigorously

as

its

5

causes"(1987, p.471)

In offering another reason, Gold-

smith (1987) argues,
It is that most social scientists simply assume
stability has instrumental economic value.
They tend to believe it is a necessary condi
tion for growth and prosperity, but rarely feel
a need to test this proposition (p.471).
The impact of political stability on economic development
has not been considered in the context of causality; in
stead, scholars have merely posited a simple relationship
between them.
Currently, however, various studies on the independ
ent effects of political instability have emerged in the
study of economic growth in the African countries, especially,

Sub-Saharan African countries.

Those who study

Sub-Saharan African countries have found that political
instability

hinders

economic

development

(Mbaku

1992;

Fosu 1992)
This thesis starts with the following question:

If

the relationship between political instability and eco
nomic development has been detected in the Sub-Saharan
African countries in several recent studies, is it possi
ble to detect the relationship in other developing coun
tries? It is assumed here that political instability hin
ders economic development particularly in the developing
countries including African, Latin and Central American,
and Asian developing countries.

6

In order to test that hypothesis, this thesis first
employs

political

variable

and

growth.

Second,

instability

examines

its

as

direct

a

major
impact

independent
on

economic

we examine the indirect impact of po-

litical instability on economic growth by indicating the
impact of political instability on several economic vari
ables that might influence economic growth.

The main

purpose of this study, though, is testing whether the em
pirical findings in Sub-Saharan countries regarding the
impact of political instability on economic growth can
also be detected in other developing countries, including
African, Central and Latin American, and Asian countries.
In order to examine the hypothesis,

this thesis is

based on the assumptions of the system approach.

Isaak

(1981) argues that "an approach, in political inquiry, is
a

general

(p.191).

strategy

for

studying

political

phenomena"

Among the various approaches, many previous re

search studies that deal with economic performance in de
veloping countries are based on system approach.
(1981) summarizes
approach:

Isaak

the basic assumptions of the system

"the commitment is made to concentrate on the

system and its behavior, including the interaction of its
elements,

but not the characteristics of the elements"

(p.279).

In terms of seeking useful explanation in po-

litical

inquiry,

another approach such as statist ap-

proach might be considered if the hypothesis can not be
confirmed.
This thesis consists of five chapters including an
introduction and conclusion.

In Chapter II,

relevant

literature will be reviewed.

This literature will in-

clude several types of research on the relationship be
tween political instability and economic growth.

Chapter

III lays out the design of the thesis including hypotheses,

research design,

data collection procedures,

and

conceptual and operational definitions.

Statistical re

sults will be described in Chapter IV.

Various results

of regression analysis will be listed in several tables
as well. If the results of regression analysis fails to
reject null hypothesis, possible explanations will be de
scribed in Chapter IV.

Finally, the significance of this

thesis and conclusions will be discussed in the last
chapter.

Recommendation for further study will also be

suggested in Chapter V.

7

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

System Approach Literature
Economic variables have been treated as a main pre
dictor for political instability by many scholars.

Usu

ally, political instability has been studied in the terms
of political conflict or violence.

lt has been widely

accepted that modernized or developed countries tend to
have less political violence than do underdeveloped coun
tries.
Some empirical studies support that tendency by ex
amining the relationship between economic change and po
litical violence or conflict.

In his article, published

in 1972, Patterns of domestic conflict: 1919-39 and 194666, Banks finds that "nonrevolutionary" states are highly
correlated with various indicators of economic develop
ment, while "revolutionary" states have a negative rela
tionship with those variables.
sions of

Conflict Behavior

In his article,

within Nations,

Dimen

1955-1960,

published in 1965, Tanter similarly finds moderate nega
tive relationships between GNP per capita and various
conflict variables through 70 countries.
larsky

(1967)

Tanter and Mid

find a negative relationship between eco8

9

nomic growth rate (GNP per capita) and

11

revolutions 11 in

four Latin American countries from 1955 to 1960.
On the other hand, another study of political vio
lence of Latin America,
there is a

done by Bwy

(1968),

shows that

positive relationship between the rate of

economic growth and organized violence and anomic vioHis empirical study on political instability in

lence.

Latin America using cross-cultural analysis during 19501959 finds that economic change hinders political stability

(1968)

A positive relationship between economic

change and political violence is also found in the study
of Flanigan and Fogelman in 1970.
terns

of

Political

Perspective,

Violence

in

In the article,
Comparative

Pat-

Historical

they find a positive relationship between

rate of economic development, which is measured by rates
of change in agricultural employment in the twentieth
century,

and

political

violence

which

is

deaths from domestic group violence (1970).

measured

by

They report

that
Countries which began their development rela
tively early and have reached high levels of
development by the mid-twentieth century are
less likely to experience domestic violence
than those which have been developing only in
the current century; and both groups of coun
tries experience less violence than countries
which began to develop only recently (1970,
p.14).

In
Force,

his

article,

Olson

suggests

Rapid

Growth

as

that economic

a

Destabilizing

growth

especially

rapid growth, leads to political instability (1963).

Ac

cording to him, economic growth involves vast changes in
the production,

demand of labor,

distribution of income (1963).

and above all in the

He argues that

When the focus in on the fact that rapid eco
nomic growth means rapid economic change, and
that economic change entails social disloca
tion, it becomes clear that both the gainers
and the losers from economic growth can be de
stabilizing forces (1963, p.533).
Some scholars find a curvilinear relationship between

economic

growth

and

political

violence.

Adams

(1970) reports a curvilinear relationship between GNP per
capita in the early 1960s and the extent of political
violence during the period 1946-65, using a 130 country
sample size.

However, when more closely examining the 71

least developed countries, a negative linear relationship
is found when the Asian and Arabian countries are ana
lyzed together with the developed countries, and a posi
tive relationship is generally found in African countries
(Adams, 1970) .

However, according to Zimmermann (1983),

there are several partly modernized countries character
ized by widespread political violence, but generally the
violence is less intense,

which means "protest" rather

the "rebellion" found in underdeveloped areas (p.94).
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On the other hand, a number of the empirical results
refute the idea that rapid socioeconomic change would di
rectly lead to such violence (Zimmermann, 1983).

Accord

ing to him, in countries at a lower level of economic de
velopment,

the relationship between economic growth and

political violence is reversed (Zimmermann, 1983).
As a descriptive study of the political instability
and its impact on the economy,

Hewitt' s research shows

that there are costs of political instability

(1993).

They can be both immediate and long term or direct and
indirect.

Although his research does not employ statis-

tical tools, such as regression analysis, his study shows
that political instability, which has been denoted to po
litical violence, hinders economic performance.
as the author indicates,

However,

this research is limited to

Western countries for methodological reasons.

According

to Hewitt (1993), "many of the questions that I wish to
examine --concerning public opinion and the economy, for
example --can only be answered if public opinion surveys
and accurate statistics are available"

(p. 2).

In light

of these limitations in his study, Hewitt (1993) suggests
that his findings cannot be applied to non-Western countries for two reasons.

He says, "First, political vio-

lence varies between types of societies.

Second, the im

pact of political violence is likely to be very different
in different kinds of societies"

(1993,

p. 2).

Table 1

11

shows how various types of political violence influenced
the economy of the countries.
Table 1
Total Cost by Country
Criminal
SelfFinancing
Property
Damage
Deaths
and
Injuries
Increased
Security
Total
90

of GDP

N.
Ireland

Spain

Germany

Italy

Uruguay

98.9

134.1

35.1

63.4

74.5

1,734.5

407.9

44.2

464.5

43.2

560.4

206.2

23.3

82.4

6.2

9717.1

4456.8

2696.7

-

88.3

12,110.9

5205.0

2799.3

610.3

212.2

4.9

4.1

0.6

0.3

5.3

Source: Hewitt 1993, p.21.
Hewitt (1993) concludes that most easily seen indi
cators are the immediate and direct effects --the people
killed and property destroyed.

These impacts can,

in

their turn, eventually produce changes in peoples' atti
tudes and behavior in a variety of contexts:

economic,

social and political.
Another descriptive study, Political Stability and
Economic Growth also suggests that the economic growth
has been achieved with sociopolitical stability in some
developing countries (Chai, Chai,

&

Clark, 1994).

Draw-

ing on four case studies dealing with Asian NICs (Newly

12

Industrialized

Countries),

South

Korea,

Taiwan,

Hong

Kong, and Singapore, this book describes successful factors of economic growth in each country.

According to

Chan (1994), one of the contributors to this book, inter
nal stability has been one of the major factors of eco
nomic growth,
country.

which has been commonly observed in every

He argues that

The governments of Singapore, South Korea, and
Taiwan have all placed high priority on estab
lishing internal stability in the earlier
Threats from their civil war opponents
years.
and/or traumatic severance from their histori
cal economic hinterland created a sense of ur
gency to secure domestic order, and helped to
mobilize (1994, pp.5-6).
In his research note, A Definition of Political Sta
bility, published in 1975, Ake revisits the problem of a
definition

of

political

stability.

According

to Ake

(1975), we should define "political" first before we define political stability.

Ake

(1975) argues that "we

have clearly not defined the political in the usual sense
of demarcating particular acts that are political from
those that are not" (p.271).

Based on this argument, he

focuses on definition of 'political' in terms of its effects.

He argues that specifying a particular effect is

more important than declarations about intrinsic differences between particular acts.

He says that "if it is

clear what this effect is, then the political is defined,
whatever variety of particular acts that may be associ-

13

ated with this effect 11
cal stability as
exchanges.

11 the

(1975, p.272).

He defines politi

regularity of the flow of political

The more regular the flow of political ex

changes, the more stability 11

(1975, p.273).

According to

him, the extent of political stability of a polity can be
determined by systematic identification of both regulari
ties

and

changes.

irregularities

in

the

flow of

political

ex-

Whether or not the flow of political exchanges

is regular relies on whether

or not there is a violation

of political behavior or act or exchange.
His argument on measurement of political stability
is expressed in terms of the concept of regularity.
cording to Ake (1975),

11

•

•

•

Ac

the level of stability should

be expressed quantitatively as a proportion: the ratio of
regular exchanges to the totality of political exchanges 11
(p.277)
1 1 if

However, in the another sense, he suggests that

we wanted to transform our measurements into some

formula for predicting changes in the level of political
stability,

some

weighting

would

be

necessary 11

(1975,

p.278).
This research note does not tel1 us much about the
definition of political stability itself.

Rather,

it

suggests how to define and measure political stability in
terms of 'political' .
this research note,

Ake

In the context of the purpose of
(1975) also mentions the merits

of the definition of political stability.

He suggests

14

that

II

first,

the definition avoids the presumption that

some political acts are intrinsically or universally destabilizing" (1975, p.279).

Second, the definition makes

it possible to avoid confusion between political insta
bility with political change and political stability with
absence of political change.

According to him, the lack

of change should be distinguished from political stability.

Third, he says that "this definition is relatively

free from the error of making statements about levels of
political stability without seriously taking into account
the totality of political exchanges" (1975, pp.280-281).
In the article,
Development in

Political Instability and Economic

Sub-Saharan Africa,

Mbaku

(1992)

shows

that there is a relationship between political instability and economic development.

In that article,

Mbaku

(1992) treats political instability as a dependent variable.

As independent variables which represent economic

development, Mbaku (1992) selects two different types of
indicators which are traditional indicators and a quality
of life index and human development index.

First of all,

he suggests that traditional indicators for gauging eco
nomic development do not correctly represent the degree
of economic development (1992, p.44)

He says,

... many researchers have criticized the use of
income per capita for gauging economic develop
ment, especially in developing countries.
It
has been argued that in countries in which
there are significant levels of inequalities in
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income distribution, rising per capita income
may arise primarily from income gains by a few
families.
Such growth, critics of the income
approach to the measurement of economic devel
opment argue, may not be accompanied by sig
nificant improvements in income distribution,
leaving the majority of the population poor and
deprived (1992, pp.44-45).
As an alternative measure of economic development, Mbaku
(1992) employs a Quality of Life Index(PQLI) and Human
Development Index(HDI) in order to examine the relation
ship between political instability and economic develop
ment more significantly.
The multiple regression results generally indicate a
negative relationship between political instability and
economic development as expected.

However, when economic

development is measured by the traditional indicators,
the parameter estimates are negative but are not significant.

When compared to the traditional indicators, the

coefficient estimate of HDI is negative and significant
at the 10 percent level of significance.
Based on the regression results, Mbaku (1992) con
cludes that political instability is a significant con
straint to the improvement of the human condition in Sub
Saharan Africa.

He says,

a significant number of countries in Sub
Saharan Africa have not been able to develop
stable political systems.
As a result, eco
nomic and human development have been given low
priority as governments spend most of their
time and national resources trying to maintain
Unless these countries
a monopoly on power.
develop institutional frameworks that permit

16
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unrestricted access to both political and eco
nomic markets, political instability will con
tinue to be a pervasive part of the region,
serving as a significant constraint to economic
and human development (1992, p.50).
In his article, Democracy. Political Stability. and
Economic

Growth

in

Developing Countries,

published

in

1986, Goldsmith examines the impact of democracy and po
litical stability on economic growth in the stable, less
developed liberal democracies (LDLDs)
theory,

Goldsmith

Based on Olson' s

(1986) suggests that because Olson's

theory comes from the postwar experience of industrial
ized countries, it needs to be tested in developing counGoldsmith (1986) assigns time as an independent

tries.

variable.

He argues,

The langer a competitive political systems ex
ists without major disruption, the greater the
opportunities for interests to organize and
lobby for distributive, antigrowth policies.
Consequently, time can be used as the independ
ent variable in the theory, serving as a proxy
for the more complex underlying phenomena of
pluralist interaction and countervalence (1986,
p.519).
For the developing countries,

he suggests,

the dependent variable is also problematic
says,

" [Olson' s]

theory

finding

(1986).

He

predicts a number of economic

consequences will emerge over time in stable and open so
cieties''

(1986, p.519).

According to him,

All economic data from LDCs must be used cau
tiously. Most of these countries have a large
subsistence sector, requiring use of shadow
prices and error-prone estimates of household
production. There is also a problems converting
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these figures into a benchmark currency such as
the dollar, because the price of the local cur
rency is usually set arbitrarily.
The United
Nations has projected to correct this last
problem by estimating purchasing power equiva
lencies for some currencies (1986, p.529).
Although there is a problem with data in LDCs, Goldsmith
employs reasonably complete time series data available on
certain major macroeconomic trends.
Goldsmith

(1986)

posts

the

three

Using those data,
following

about the direction that stable LDLDs
Liberal Democracies) move over time:

(Less developed

(1) their tendency

to emphasize consumption over investment,
creasing reliance on big government,
clining

rate

of

economic

growth

hypotheses

(2) their in

and ( 3) their de-

(p.520)

Goldsmith

(1986) tests these hypotheses using both longitudinal and
cross-sectional

analysis.

When

testing

seven

LDLDs,

Goldsmith (1986) finds that "less developed liberal de
mocracies do not display tendencies toward disinvestment
or larger-than-normal public sectors.

There does,

how-

ever, appear to be support for the third hypothesis that
LDLDs undergo progressive economic slowdown" (Goldsmith,
1986, p.520).
In another article, Does Political Stability Rinder
Economic Development?,

published in 1987,

Goldsmith ap

plies his question to the direct relationship between po
litical

stability

World(1987).

and

economic

growth

in

the

Third

In his earlier work, he selected only sta-

ble

developing

countries,

and

found

economic

slowdown

within those countries.

He also focused somewhat on de-

mocracy.

however,

This article,

selects seven less de-

veloped countries and examines the effects of political
stability on the rate of change in income (1987).
dicators of political instability,

As in

Goldsmith (1987) em

ploys four political phenomena: assassinations, irregular
executive transfers,

armed attacks,

mestic political violence(p.474).

and deaths from do
Goldsmith (1987) sums

each indicator over the two most recent decades in order
Those two time periods

to test Olson's theory(p.474).
are 1958-67,

which is assigned as STABl,

which is assigned as STAB2,

(1987,

and 1968-1977,

p.474).

Goldsmith

(1987) employs time series on the growth of real gross
domestic product (GDP) as an indicator of the dependent
variable,

economic growth (p.475).

smith (1987),

According to Gold

the World Bank has calculated how quickly

the GDP of its members grew between 1960-1970 which is
assigned

as GROWl

GROW2 (p.475).
sis.
11

and

1970-1980

which

is

assigned

as

Figure 1 shows the results of this analy

The chronically unstable country group stands for

less stable II in both periods.

The stabilizing country

group stands for moving from "less stable 11 to "more sta
ble. 11

The consistently stable country group stands for

"more stable" in both periods.

The destabilizing country
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group stands for moving from "more stable" to "less sta
ble."
Political Instability
Index (1958-67)
HIGH
LOW
STAB2 = 11.8
STABl = 40.0

Political
Instability
Index
(1968-77)

Chronically
Unstable
N = 23
GROWl = 4.6%
GROW2 = 4.0%

HIGH
STAB1=38.5

Stabilizing
N = 16
GROWl = 4.9%
GROW2 = 5.0%

LOW
STAB2=11.1

Source: Goldsmith, A. A.

Destabilizing
N = 7

GROWl = 5.4%
GROW2 = 3.9%

Consistently
Stable
N = 31
GROWl = 4.6%
GROW2 = 3.7%

(1987) p.476.

Figure 1. Goldsmith's Country Groupings.
As Goldsmith (1987) indicates, this empirical result
does not support Olson's theory. Goldsmith

(1987) pro

vides several possible explanations for that negative re
sult,

including short time periods and biased political

instability data (p.477).

Particularly, Goldsmith (1987)

suggests that "Olson's theory may be only applicable to
liberal democracies where interest groups have a dominant
influence on political and economic processes" (p.477).
Fosu (1992) shows relatively more refined empirical
analysis on the relationship between political instabil-
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ity and economic development particularly in Sub-Saharan
African countries.

He employs political instability as

an independent variable, and tries to find the impact of
political instability on economic development.

He argues

that '' some previous researchers fail to shed light on how
political
growth"

instability

(1992,

might

have

influenced

economic

p.830). In explaining this failure,

Fosu

suggests that those researches either did not provide an
accurate estimate of the impact of political instability
or treat political instability as a dependent variable.
His hypothesis starts from the premise that "politi
cal stability may serve to reduce the availability of
factors of production" (1992, p.830)
political

instability

influences

According to Fosu,
economic

development

through several "factors of production" including lack of
investment, emigrating labor forces, and reducing produc
tion output (1992).
those steps,

He hypothesizes that as a result of

political instability,

finally,

may nega

tively influence the economic growth.
In his article,

political instability has been de

fined as instability of governments, regimes, and commu
nities within a nation

(1992,

p.830).

He employs coup

d' etat as an indicator representing political instabil
ity;

11

it is assumed that a successful coup indicates the

greatest degree of instability, followed by an unsuccess
ful coup, and then by a plot" (1992, p.832)

He assigns
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respective weights of 5, 3, and 1 to these (1992,

p. 832) .

This research measures political instability by assigning
different weights depending upon whether or not it is
successful.

In this way, the successful coup de' tat is

assigned 5 points, unsuccessful coup de'tat 3 points, and
According to this measure,

each plot will be 1 point.

the lower the number of points that a nation has,

the

more stable it is.
However, Fosu (1992) observes that such a weighting
scheme may be arbitrary.
Indeed, the resulting index [of political in
stability] has no interval significance.
How
ever, the index is highly positively correlated
with indexes constructed from alternative addi
tive weighting schemes, with rank ordering of
the countries by degree of political instabil
ity generally preserved.
However, the possi
bility that different weights may indeed result
in appreciable changes in rankings suggests
that a dichotomous variable based on the index
may be preferable (Fosu, 1992, p.832)
As Fosu mentioned,

growth rates of labor,

capital

and exports have been added as independent variables with
a measure of political instability to consider the production- function framework

(1992) .

The growth rate of

output has been designated as a dependent variable.
This article, as the author suggests, may be viewed
as a first attempt to apply an economic framework to em
pirically account for the implications of political instability for economic growth.

Nevertheless, the empiri-

cal findings in his article suggest that "political in-
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stability has played a major role in the relatively stag
nant economies of Sub-Sahara Africa,
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accounting for a

substantial reduction in the region's overall GDP growth
over the 1960-1986 period"

(1992, p.838).

Finally Fosu

(1992) suggests that any future economic development pro
gram in the African countries should consider the problem
of political instability.
Literature of Alternative Approaches
In this section, I will review some alternative ap
proaches both on political instability and on economic
growth in order to find out what kind of other factors
that might determine political instability and economic
growth are available.

By doing so, we can draw more wide

political factors that might determine the phenomena of
economic growth.
In Political Order in Changing Societies, a classi
cal study of political instability, Huntington (1968) fo
cuses on the phenomenon of political stability and fac
tors that shape a stable political condition in a chang
ing society.

His maj or concern is that in large part,

the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobili
zation of new groups into politics is coupled with the
slow development of political institutions.

He suggests

that the relationship between the rate of institutional
and organizational formation within the political system
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and the rate of social mobilization is an important fac
tor that determines the degree of political order.

He

argues that "just as economic development depends,

in

some measure, on the relation between investment and con
sumption, political order depends in part of the relation
between the development of political institutions and the
mobilization
vii).

of

new

social

forces

into

politics"

(p,

According to Huntington, the level of institution

alization of any political system can be defined by the
adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its
organizations and procedures.
Huntington suggests that when the development of po
litical institutions cannot follow social and economic
change,

that is a primary problem in the politics in

terms of political instability.

Development and the re

sultant political order are obtained when institutional
and organizational growth are compatible with the rate of
social mobilization and the resultant political partici
pation.

When the rate of social mobilization greatly

surpasses the rate of institutional formation during cer
tain period of time,

the political system will not be

able to cope with demands made upon it and political de
cay will set in.

He suggests, thus,

that in that case,

there is a correlation between social frustration and po
litical instability and this relationship is due to the
lack of two potential intervening variables which are op-

portunities for social and economic mobility and adapt
able political institutions.
He also explains revolution in terms of dramatic
progress to modernization.
is a rapid,

fundamental,

According to him, "revolution
and violent domestic change in

the dominant values and myths of a society,
li tical institutions,

social structure,

government activity and policies"

(p.

in its po

leadership,
264)

and

He argues

that the cause and condition of revolution are the same
as other

forms of violence and instability.

"revolution

occurs

in

societies

that

have

He says
experienced

some social and economic development and where the proc
esses of political modernization and political develop
ment have lagged behind the processes of social and eco
nomic change" (p. 265) .
In his work,

political order has been treated in

terms of the relationship between institutions and social
forces.

Also as reviewed earlier, political instability

is a dependent variable, which is determined by the rela
tion between social frustration and mobilization and in
stitutionalization.
Contrary to Huntington' s analysis on political in
stability and revolution, there are different approaches
in terms of finding the causes of revolutions.
In States and Social Revolutions,
social-revolutionary transformations in

Skocpol analyzes
French,

Russia,
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and China.
structure,

She focuses on three major conceptions, state
international forces,

and class relations in

order to explain the origins and accomplishments of so
cial-revolutionary transformations.

In particular,

the

reason the book was attracts scholars' attention is that
it introduces

'the Statist approach'

three social revolutions.

to explore these

Skocpol, one of neostatists,

tries to place the state at the center of the analysis of
social-revolutionary transformations and focuses on its
autonomy and capacity.
According to her,
11

rapid,

revolutions can be

defined as

basic transformations of a society' s state and

class structures; and they are accompanied and in part
carried through by class-based revolts from below"
4) .
of

(p.

She argues that existing social-scientific theories
revolutions,

including

Marxists

and

structure

functionalists, are not adequate for explanation in order
to analyze the causes and the outcomes of social revolu
tions.

She criticizes the social scientific approach and

Marxist approach because of their failure to consider
state structure and economic determinants.

Accordingly,

she argues that social revolutions should be studied in
the context of social and state structure.

She suggests

three theoretical perspectives, a structural perspective,
international and world-historical contexts, and the po
tential autonomy of the state.
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She follows a Weberian perspective in terms of con
sideration of the state, that is, the state must be con
sidered as more than the government.

Based on those con

ceptions on the state, Skocpol argues that "the histori
cal realities of social revolutions insistently suggest
the need for a more state-centered approach" (p. 29).

As

a matter of fact, Skcopol's state-centered model provides
a new heuristic ground to understand another side of po
litical reality that many social scientists have ignored.
Another alternative to the study of economic per
formance can be found in Katzenstein's book, Small States
in World Markets.

Katzenstein's observation on the world

economy during 1970s and 1980s is that the structure of
the world economy has been changed.

A central question

following from this observation is how small European
states cope with structural change in world economy and
succeed in both economically and politically.
to explain his main thesis,

In order

Katzenstein focuses on two

phenomena which are observed in small European states,
'flexible adjustment' and 'democratic corporatism.'
According to Katzenstein, there are three political
responses to economic change corresponding to the domi
nant political forms of contemporary capitalism.

First,

liberal states such as the United States and Britain,
rely on macroeconomic policies and market solutions in
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the economic change.

In the case of the United States

particularly, Katzenstein argues that,
confronted with economic change, the U.S. gov
ernment and U.S. firms prefer adjustment in
global markets to reliance on government ac
Free trade and foreign investment by
tion.
firms rather than industrial policy coordinated
by the government is the option they favor
(p.25).

The industrial policy of the United States coping with
economic
straints,

change

can

be

seen

as

voluntary

orderly marketing agreements,

export

re

and administra

tive interventions.
Second,

Statist states such as Japan

are endowed

with the means and the institutions to preempt the costs
of change through policies that pursue the structural
transformation of their economies.

Katzenstein argues

that Japan's industrial policy is focused on anticipating
structural changes in markets and to assisting industries
to be able to compete in certain industry segments or
product
state,

lines.

As

Katzenstein

a typical example
describes

Japan

and

of
its

the

statist

industrial

policy in the changing economy as follows; "Japan's inno
vative industrial policy focused on long-term market de
velopment, relied on protection while establishing inter
national competiti veness,

and relinquished that protec

tion, often under intense foreign pressure, when interna
tional competitiveness had been achieved" (p. 26)
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Finally, democratic corporatism on which Katzenstein
mainly focuses in this book shows that small European
states respond to economic change with flexible policies
of

industrial

adjustment.

According

to

Katzenstein,

small European states "neither export the costs of change
through

protection

nor

preempt

the

costs

through structural transformation" (p. 58).
success

or

failure

in

adjusting

to

of

change

In terms of

economic

change,

Katzenstein argues that "...small countries have largely
succeeded in this task, and they have done so by taking
into account both the economic and the political require
ments of rapid change"

(p. 29).

According to Katzen

stein, small European states that follow democratic cor
poratism "adjust to economic change through a carefully
calibrated balance of economic flexibility and political
stability" (p. 29).
As a conclusion,

Katzenstein argues that the eco

nomic openness and democratic corporatist structures of
the small European states have had a strong effect on
their political strategies and successful economic per
formance.
Summary
Studies on the relationship between political insta
bility

and economic growth

show

differences depending

upon what researchers focus on, how they construct their
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regression model; that is what is the dependent variable.
In this chapter,
viewed.

two research tendencies have been re

The studies that assign political instability as

the dependent variable are reviewed in the first section.
In the most of studies,

political instability has been

conceptulized in terms of political violence or conflict.
Various studies find that there is a negative relation
ship between economic growth and political instability.
Second, I review the studies that employ political insta
bility as the independent variable seeking its impact on
economic growth, which affect the hypothesis of this thesis.

Particularly, I review the study of Sub-Saharan Af-

rican countries dealing with the relationship between po
litical instability and economic growth.
stability,

in those studies,

terms of elite instability,
number of coups.

Political in

has been conceptualized in
which is operationalized by

They find that political instability

hinders economic growth.
At the end of this chapter, three important studies
on political order and social revolutions have been re
viewed.

Huntington's analysis of political order dis

cusses the cases of political instability during moderni
zation period in underdeveloped countries.

Skocopol's

study of social revolution provides an alternative ap
proach to the cause and outcome of social revolution.
Finally Katzenstein's Small States in World Markets shows

that democratic corporatist structures along with eco
nomic openness in small European states have had a strong
effect on their political strategies and successful eco
nomic performance.
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CHAPTER III
DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Hypotheses
In order to test the impact of political instability
on economic development, the following hypotheses will be
examined:
Hl: Cross-nationally, Political Instability may serve to
decrease the availability of factors of production.
H2: Cross-nationally, Political Instability will decrease
the quantity of labor.
H3:

Cross-nationally,

Political

Instability

may

nega

tively influence the timing and organization of the
production process.
Design of the Thesis
The purpose of this study is to examine the empiri
cal relationship between political instability and economic development.

In order to do that, this study em-

ploys a statistical method using cross-sectional multiple
regression analysis using cases from the developing na
tions,

including Asian,

Central and Latin American,

African countries.
The estimated equation is as follows:
32

and
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where G, K, L, and X are growth rates of output, labor,
capital, and exports respectively. P is a measure of Po
litical Instability, that is, the independent impact of
Political Instability when quantities of labor and capi
tal are controlled for, and v is the stochastic distur
bance, which is assumed to be independently and identi
cally distributed.
Consistent with neoclassical theory,
expected to be positive.

ß1 and ß2 are

Given the desirable influence

of exports on economic growth found in previous studies,
ß3 should be positive.

Most important, the above theo-

retical discussion regarding the effect of political in
stability leads to the prediction that a4 will be posi
tive.
In this thesis, the cases include developing coun
tries in Asia, Africa, and Latin and Central America.

As

indicated in the first chapter, the research question of
this thesis is based on previous research on the impact
of

political

instability

Saharan countries.

on

economic

growth

in

Sub-

In order to increase the explanatory

power of the impact of political instability on economic
growth, it is necessary for this research to cover more
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regions

and

Therefore,

cases.

Asian,

Latin,

Central

American, and African countries are included in this thesis.

East European developing countries are excluded be-

cause they used to be communist societies so they do not
Other

provide proper economic data for this research.

communist countries such as China and North Korea are
also excluded because of a lack of data.

Countries that

are considered in this thesis are listed in Appendix A.
Definitions of the Concepts
Political Instability
Political instability is a concept that can be explicated in various ways.

According to Hurwitz

(1973),

there are five different ways to define political instability/stability.

First,

it can be explicated in the

context of the "existence of violence".

Feieraband

&

Feieraband (1966) thus define political instability as
the degree or the amount of aggression directed
by individuals or groups within the political
system against other groups or against the com
plex of officeholders and individuals and
Or, conversely,
groups associated with them.
it is the amount of aggression directed by
these officeholders against other individuals,
groups, or officeholders within the polity
(Feieraband & Feieraband, 1966, p.250).
Lack of a legitimate constitutional order has also
been used as a definition of political instability.

For

example, Lipset (1981) regards legitimacy as a vital com-

ponent of any serious study of political stability.

Hur

witz (1973) indicates that "Lipset states that a legiti
mate

[stable]

society is evidenced by the absence over

the past 25 years of a major political movement opposed
to the democratic rules of the game" (p.456).
Existence of structural change has also been considered

as

evidence

of

political

instability.

Hurwitz

(1973) states that
A system is seen as stable if it has been able
to avoid changes in its basic structural ar
rangement/ configuration over the years. Conti
nuity or persistence of form distinguishes sta
ble polities from those unable to maintain
their pattern in the face of environmental
pressures (p.457).
Ake (1967) and Field (1967) define political instability
in the context of the existence of structural change.
According to Hurwitz (1973), political stability can
be defined "in the sense that it is 'systemic stability'
rather than any one isolated monomeasure"

(p.45 8).

He

explains that
This approach of course, is less amenable to
precise quantification because the various so
cietal attributes offered by some do not easily
lend themselves to mathematical indicators.
This does not mean that the approach is without
merit, however, for it rightfully recognizes
that the concept of 'stability' cannot be re
duced to isolated variables (Hurwitz, 1973,
p.458).
Finally,

according to Hurwitz

(1973),

there

is a

governmental duration approach in the definition of political

instability.

Hurwitz

(1973)

describes

that
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"Country A is deemed to be more stable than Country B if
the former has a government/administration that remains
in office, on average, for a longer time span than that
of the latter" (p. 452) .
The definition of political instability used in this
thesis is based largely on Hurwitz's categories regarding
the lack of governmental duration and structural change.
In most of the Less Developed Countries, government has
played a major role in the economic performance.

In that

sense, in order to capture the relationship between po
litical instability and economic development in the de
veloping countries, it is appropriate that political in
stability is defined in terms of the lack of governmental
duration.
Economic Growth
Economic growth can be defined in various ways de
pending upon the dimensions of economic phenomena that
researchers focus on.

During the peak of modernization

theory, economic growth was considered in terms of a series of historical stages.

Typical of this approach is

Rostow's Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto

(1960) .

Berberoglu

(1992)

briefly describes Ros-

tow's five stages of economic growth as follows:
The initial stage is called "the traditional
society," characterized by traits supposedly
typical of the rural, non-capitalist sector of
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underdeveloped countries. Next is the "precon
ditioning" stage, followed by the 'take-off,'
the 'drive to maturity,' and, finally, the "age
of high mass-consumption" (p.9).
Economic growth thus becomes a matter of whether or not
certain condition exist, such as free markets, free en
terprise, modern tax systems, the rationalization of the
state and so on.
In more recent years, economic growth has begun to
be considered in the context of production.

Although

most empirical research dealing with economic growth does
not clearly define the theoretical concept of economic
growth,

these

authors

intentionally

consider

economic

growth in the context of the growth of production.
on

extensive

research

(Olson,

1982;

Goldsmith,

Based
1986,

1987; Weede, 1990; Fosu, 1992; Mbaku, 1992; Chai, Chai, &
Clark, 1994), the definition used in this thesis limits
its meaning to the overall increase in the national product.

This

thesis

employs

several

economic

factors,

growth of capital, gross domestic investment, and growth
of the labor force, which are treated as production inputs.

Fosu (1992) argues that "[certain]

type of study

on economic growth investigates the degree to which in
ter-country

economic

growth

differentials

may

be

ex

plained by differences in production inputs" (p.829). Ac
cording to him,

11

such studies tend to emphasize the role

of exports in LDCs and employ an augmented production-

function framework with exports as a functional argument"
(1992, p.839).
Operational Definition
Political Instability
There are several operational definitions of politi
cal instability in the context of governmental duration.
Russett (1964) measures political instability by tracing
the number of chief executives.

He measures the average

number of years the chief executive remained in office
(Russett,

1964).

Blondel

(1968) and Taylor and Herman

(1971) also define political instability in the context
of governmental duration.
tion

is

(1968).

presented

in

Blondel's operational defini-

terms

of

years

per

government

According to Blondel (1968),

...any administration is considered as on gov
ernment which fulfilled two conditions: that of
being headed by the same prime minister and
that of relying on the support of the same
party or parties in the Chamber (p. 190).
Taylor and Herman (1971) operationalize political insta
bility as the number of separate governments and the duration of those governments in days.

This thesis borrows

its operational definition from Blondel and from Taylor
and Herman.

However,

since this thesis considers both

presidential and parliamentary systems,

the meaning of

the government in the presidential system has to be de-
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fined.

In this thesis, any administration is considered

as one government when one president remains in office in
In those countries which have

the presidential system.

parliamentary systems, the meaning of government is con
sidered as the same as Blondel's.

Finally, political in

stability can be operationalized as average number of
years chief executive remains in office.
Economic Growth
First, the dependent variable, economic growth, will
be measured as the mean annual GDP growth rate (in per
cent) over the 1948-1977 period.
of capital,

Following Fosu, growth

growth of labor force,

merchandise exports

have

been

and growth rate of

selected

as

independent

variables in order to examine the indirect effects of po
litical instability on economic growth (1992).

Growth of

capital can be measured as mean gross domestic investment
as a percentage of GDP.

Growth of the labor force can be

measured as the mean annual percent growth rate of the
labor force.

Growth of exports can be measured as the

average annual percent growth rate of merchandise exports
(Fosu, 1992).
Data Collection Procedures
Data for average number of years chief executive of
ficers remain in office are calculated from Current world
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Leaders: Almanac and Current World Leaders: Biography and
News for 1970 to 1978.

Those for 1979 to 1990 are calcu-

lated from Current World Leaders.

Data for average GDP

growth rate, mean gross domestic investment as a percent
age of GDP,
merchandise

and average annual percent growth rate of
exports

are calculated from

World

Tables.

Growth of Labor Force is from World Development Report.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS
Findings of Analysis
Multiple regression analysis has been employed to
examine the production function in economic development.
Table 2 shows the result of multiple regression analysis.
R2 , the coefficients of determination,

(. 317) shows that

the independent variables, the Growth of Capital, Growth
of Capital, and Growth of Merchandise moderately explain
the variance of economic growth.

Consistent with expec

tations, the coefficients of Growth of Capital and Growth
of Merchandise Export are all positive,

although growth

of capital is only marginally significant.

Contrary to

expectation and the results of Fosu' s study

(1992),

the

coefficient of Growth of Labor Force is not significant.
Including the above index of political instability,
the result of the analysis raises the standard error of
the estimate in Growth of Capital and Growth of Labor
Force in Table 3.

R2 has not been changed.

In addition,

the coefficient of the index of political instability
does

not

have

the

expected positive sign,
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nor

is it

Table 2
Multiple Regression Equations for Economic Growth 1
Independent variables

Constant

Growth of Capital
-.309
Growth of the Labor Force
-.309
Growth of Merchandise Export -.309

ß

.294
.091
.393

Standard
Error

.062
.428
.049

Rr--

T
stat.

.317 2.001
.627
2.918

Sig.
Level

.052
.534
.006

The growth of capital is measured as mean gross domestic investment as a percentage
of GDP; Growth of the Labor Force is the mean annual percent growth rate of the labor
force; Growth of Merchandise Export is the average annual percent growth rate of
merchandise exports.

,i:,.
N

Table 3
Multiple Regression Equations for Economic Growth 2
Independent variables
Growth of
Growth of
Growth of
Political

Capital
the Labor Force
Merchandise Export
Instability

Constant
-.300
-.300
-.300
-.300

ß

.295
.091
.393
-.005

Standard
Error
.063
.434
.050
.049

R'
.317

T
stat.
1.972
.619
2.862
-.035

Sig.
Level

.056
.539
.007
.973

The Growth of Capital is measured as mean gross domestic investment as a percentage
of GDP; The Growth of the Labor force is the mean annual percent growth rate of the
labor force; The Growth of Merchandise Export is the average annual percent growth
rate of merchandise exports.

.i:,.
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statistically significant.

As Fosu (1992) indicated, the

index of political instability might have a lack of in
terval significance,

so a dichotomous variable for po

litical instability may be applied.

Consequently,

dummy variable for poli tical instability,

PD,

the

has been

assigned, which takes on unity if a given country has an
index value below the mean value for the cases and zero
otherwise.
countries

Using this dichotomous scheme,
are

classified

into

"high"

the cases of
-and

II

low"

countries, as shows in the Appendix A.
Regression results with the binary PI variable PD
replacing the index of political instability are reported
in Table 4.

Contrary to Fosu's study (1992), not only is

the coefficient of PD statistically insignif icant,
also the sign of the coefficient is negative.

but

The indi

vidual coefficients of the remaining variables have not
been changed.

The dummy variable does not help to in-

crease significance but affects nothing in the original
model.

Consequently,

according to the statistical re-

sults, there is no evidence that political instability as
measured by average number of years the chief executi ve
remains in office has an impact on economic growth as
measured by average growth of Gross Domestic Product in
the developing countries.
Tables 5,

6, and 7 show the indirect impact of po

litical instability

on

economic growth by analyzing the
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Table 4
Multiple Regression Equations for Economic Growth 3
Independent variables
Growth of
Growth of
Growth of
Political

Capital
the Labor Force
Merchandise Export
Instability(dummy)

Constant
-.172
-.172
-.172
-.172

ß

.293
.090
.400
-.043

Standard
Error
.063
.433
.050
.598

R�
.318

T
stat.
1.968
.618
2.898
-.316

Sig.
Level

.056
.540
.006
.754

The Growth of Capital is measured as mean gross domestic investment as a percentage
of GDP; The Growth of the Labor Force is the mean annual percent growth rate of the
labor force; The Growth of Merchandise Export is the average annual percent growth
rate of merchandise exports; Political Instability dummy variable takes on unity if a
country has an index value above the mean, but zero otherwise.
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Table 5
Indirect Effect of Political Instability on Economic Growth 1
Independent variables
Political Instability(dummy)

Constant
2.686

ß
-.101

Standard
Error

R

.192

.010

T
stat.

-.754

Sig.
Level

.454

Dependent Variable is Growth Rate of Labor Force
Political instability dummy variable takes on unity if a country has an index value
above the mean, but zero otherwise.
Table 6
Indirect Effect of Political Instability on Economic Growth 2
Independent variables
Political Instability(dummy)

Constant
20.494

ß
- .049

Standard
Error
1.645

R

.002

T
stat.

-.379

Sig.
Level

.706

Dependent Variable is the Growth of Capital.
Political instability dummy variable takes on unity if a country has an index value
above the mean, but zero otherwise.
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Table 7
Indirect Effect of Political Instability on Economic Growth 3
Independent variables
Growth of Capital
Growth of the Labor Force
Political Instability(dummy)

Constant
.399

.399
.399

ß
.204

-.045
.150

Standard
Error
.198

1.388

1.896

R:!

.059

T
stat.

1.201

-.264
.967

Sig.
Level

.237

.793
.339

Dependent Variable is the average annual percent growth rate of merchandise exports.
The Growth of Capital is measured as mean gross domestic investment as a percentage
of GDP. The growth of the labor force is the mean annual percent growth rate of the
labor force. Political Instability dummy variable takes on unity if a country has an
index value above the mean, but zero otherwise.
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impact of political instability on growth capital and the
growth rate of merchandise export.

Table 5 shows the im

pact of political instability on the growth rate of the
labor force.

The coefficient of determination of the

equation is just .010 and the sign of correlation coeffi
cients is negative. Furthermore, the T value is not sta
tistically significant.

Table 6 also examines the impact

of political instability on growth of capital.

Consis

tent with the above result, the coefficient of determina
tion is very low, .002, and the sign of correlation coef
ficients is negative.
lower than above.
capital,

Statistical significance is even

Table 7 shows the impact of growth of

growth rate of the labor force,

and political

instability on growth rate of merchandise exports.

As

seen in Table 7,

the coefficients of determination is

very 1 ow

The sign of the coefficients for the

( .0 5 9 ) .

growth rate of the labor force is unexpectedly negative.
None of those independent variable is statistically sig
nificant.

Consequently,

direct impact,

consistent with the result of

there is no statistical evidence of the

impact of political instability on those variables.
Going back to the hypothesis that I developed in the
previous chapter,

the multiple regression procedures do

not reject the null hypothesis that there is no statisti
cal relationship between political instability and eco-
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nomic growth.

Some possible explanations for this insig
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nificance will be described in the following section.
Possible Reasons for Insignificance
In the empirical research, statistical significance
is crucial to support hypotheses or to rej ect null hy
potheses.

It is fair to assume that researchers do not

want their analysis to be insignificant.
the

analysis

is

not

statistically

However, when

significant,

situation becomes a new challenge for researchers.
other words,

that
In

suggesting reasons for insignificance be

comes a new part of the analysis. Consequently, statisti
cal insignificance has to be analyzed in the various di
mensions.

Under this new challenge,

I identify several

possible reasons for the statistical insignificance found
in the empirical research.

They can be divided into two

categories, theoretical and methodological.
Theoretical Consideration
The crucial theoretical problem is how to select or
employ a relevant explanatory variable in the explanation
of the phenomenon.

It is virtually impossible to vali

date and define the exclusive impact of only one inde
pendent variable, which in my case is political instabil
ity.

In the phenomenon of economic growth, there would

be various variables that might have an impact on eco-
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nomic growth.

Here,

the fact that the selection of an

independent variable might be influenced by a certain ap
proach will be considered.
First,

I have to ask if a systems approach really

helps to find the impact of political instability on eco
nomic growth in developing countries.

This deals with

the debate between the state approach and systems ap
proach.

As briefly indicated in the Introduction,

the

systems approach does not consider the characteristics of
the state itself.

In other words, the state can never be

an independent variable.
system approach are,

More important variables in the

as Isaak

(1981) argues, the system

and its behavior including interaction of its elements.
In that context, the hypothesis employed in this thesis
is derived from the system approach.
In the State and Social Revolution,

Skocpol

argues that in the study of social revolution,

(1979)

existing

theories which are based on the assumption of the system
approach do not help us to understand the causes and outcomes of social revolution.

The reason is that, accord-

ing to her, social revolution occurs not by purposive ac
tion but by structural forces within the certain states
which are autonomous from society (1979).

Consequently,

the concept of state is necessary to find the causes and
outcomes of social revolution (1979).

Then, how is the state approach related to the subThe main hypothesis of the thesis

ject of this thesis?

is that political instability negatively influences economic growth.

There is no consideration of the state in

this thesis.

However,

as long as statistical analysis

does not support the hypothesis, it might be worthwhile
to consider the impact of the state as an intervening
variable or even an independent variable.

For example,

the corporatist perspective and bureaucratic authoritar
ian perspective can be considered in some way.
In the study of successful economic performance in
small European states, Katzenstein employs the concept of
corporatist states.

He identifies three kinds of state,

including the liberal state, statist state, and corpora
tist state depending upon how each kind of state copes
with changes in the world economy. According to Katzen
stein,

democratic corporatism,

on which he mainly fo

cuses,

shows that small European states respond to eco

nomic change with flexible policies of industrial adjust
ment.

Consequently,

according to Katzenstein,

economic

success in small European states can be explained only
when democratic corporatism is considered.
In his book, The State and Society: Peru in Compara
tive Perspective, Stepan (1978) argues that state plays a
major role in some of the models used in contemporary political analysis.

While introducing Organic-Statism and
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its model of governance, the corporatist state, he argues
that in Latin American countries,

such as Mexico,

the

state apparatus plays a central role in creating the po
litical,

ideological,

and economic infrastructure neces

sary for the emergence of the national bourgeoisie. According to him, state matters in relation to development
and it should be treated as a significant independent
variable in the analysis.
Hirschman
for

(1958)

development

and

assumes that capital is necessary
in

developing

countries,

a

major

source for capital is the state itself due to the lack of
economic performance of individuals and private groups.
According to him,

no developing country can pursue its

development without state involvement in the economy.
Consequently excluding the influences of the state
in the analysis of economic performance,

especially for

the analysis of developing countries, might be a mistake.
Methodological Consideration
The Problem of Conceptualization
Concepts are the basic units of analysis in the the
ory,

which

is the

final

product of

scientific

study.

Phillips (1976) suggests that "concepts are abstractions
used by scientists as building blocks for the development
of

propositions

and theories that explain and predict
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phenomena"
gained

(p.

56).

without

Thus,

scientific theory cannot be

sound conceptualization.

According

to

Isaak (1981), concepts are defined at two levels of abstraction, the theoretical and the observational.

Defi-

nitions at the theoretical level are called intuitive
definitions,

and definitions at the observational level

are called operational definitions.
Intuitive

definitions

are

the general meaning of a term.
Watson

(1976),

theoretical

and

convey

According to McGaw and

"they indicate what the term means in a

general sense, and they suggest how the concept relates
to other concepts.

Intuitive definitions,

however,

do

not specify unequivocal instructions for observing and
measuring instances of a concept" (p. 125).
Operational definitions define concepts by specify
ing the operations for observing and measuring their in
stances.

According to

Isaak,

operational

definitions

connect intuitive definitions with empirical observables.
As indicated in a previous chapter, political insta
bility can be defined in various ways.

As indicated in

the previous chapter which deals with intuitive defini
tion, the phenomena of political instability have several
dimensions.

The problem is that intuitive definitions

cannot configure the context of political phenomena per
fectly.

Consequently,

the lack of statistical signifi

cance of this thesis could be due to the lack of validity
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of the concept of political instability which was defined
in terms of the lack of government duration.
There is another possible reason for statistical in
significance.

lt is the issue of operational defini

The operational definition that has been employed

tions.

to observe the lack of government duration empirically is
the average number of years a chief executive remains in
office.

A possible problem results from the question

whether those indicators can capture the theoretical con
cept.

The fact is that there is a gap between existing

political phenomena and empirical indicators which are
defined in quantitative terms.

Consequently, statistical

insignificance might be caused by the empirical indica
tors

which

cannot fully

represent

political

phenomena

such as political instability.
The Problem of Design
Another

question

about

statistical

insignificance

might be the usefulness of cross-sectional analysis.

As

a matter of fact, this issue is related to intuitive and
operational definitions.

In many cases of empirical re

search, the type of research design relies on how to de
fine and operationalize the key concepts.

I define po

litical instability in the context of government dura
tion, and compare forty three developing countries cross
sectionally.

If the configuration of political instabil-
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ity is defined in other ways, such as in terms of domes
tic violence,

then the design would be different from

what I employed.

I already mentioned questions about

conceptualization and operationalization problems.

Now,

I have to answer another dimension of the methodological
issue which is the type of design.
In his article,
in Northern Ireland.

Deprivation and Political Violence
1922-1985,

Thompson

(1989) argues

that theories of social conflict and political movements
cannot be efficiently tested with cross-sectional data.
According to him,
rather, time-series data, where variables are
measured at regular intervals over a period of
time, are required... the evaluation of social
policy is inherently oriented to change, and
time-series analysis is appropriate for assess
ing the effects of policy shifts (p. 677).
The statistical insignificance of this thesis might be
caused by the type of design,

cross-national analysis,

which does not capture time impact of countries that have
been tested.

Of course, in general, time-series analysis

has a limitation in terms of the number of cases, since
available data are limited to certain years.

Thus, given

the number of cross-national cases, representing develop
ing countries of Asia,

Latin and Central America,

and

Sub-Saharan Africa, it would be more powerful and appro
priate if pooled time-series analysis were employed.

The
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advantage of

pooled time series analysis will be dis

cussed more at Chapter V.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Economic growth is one of the maj or issues in the
less developed countries.

Economic growth and political

stability have been maj or subj ects in the modernization
approach for several decades due in large part to the re
flection of political and economic phenomena in the less
developed countries.

The relationship between economic

growth and political stability has been studied in vari
ous forms depending upon which factor scholars are using
as

the

dependent

variable.

Until

recently,

economic

growth was an independent variable which allegedly determined political order or stability.

Scholars focused on

why certain countries are not stable while others are.
In this kind of study, scholars conclude that rapid eco
nomic growth is highly related to relative deprivation
and

ultimately

other

hand,

causes

some

political

scholars

instability.

studying

primarily

On

the

African

countries employ economic growth as a dependent variable
which is explained by political order.
the more political stability,

They suggest that

the more economic growth.

They find an empirical relationship between those two
variables in recent years.
political

factor

in

Those studies emphasize the

economic
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growth.

However,

those

studies limit their scope to a certain geographical area
which is the Sub-Saharan African countries.

In there an

empirical relationship between political stability and
economic growth not only in some African countries but
also in all developing countries?

That is the main theme

of this thesis.
In this thesis,

I have hypothesized that political

instability, defined in the context of governmental dura
tion,

is likely to have a negative effect on economic

growth.

The relationship between political instability

and economic growth has been examined cross-nationally
over the 1970-1990 period for a sample of 43 developing
countries.

Multiple regressions based on augmented pro-

duction-function framework, which includes as functional
arguments labor, capital, and export, as well as politi
cal

instability,

measured by

average

number

of

years

chief executive remains in office, do not lend support to
the hypothesis that political instability has a deleteri
ous impact on economic growth.
Some explanations about statistical insignificance
have been represented in Chapter IV in terms of theoreti
cal and methodological dimensions.

First, in the selec

tion of the explanatory variable, I examined other possi
bilities in the context of other approaches such as the
statist approach focusing on the characteristics of the
state.

Second,

in the explications of methodological
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problems, I examined two dimensions.

First, the problem

of defining configurations of the phenomena of political
instability has been explained in two different level of
abstractness,

conceptual

and

operational

definitions.

Second, alternative type of designs, time-series analysis
and pooled time-series were introduced.
Despite the fact that the null hypotheses have not
been rejected, this thesis makes several contribution to
the study of political instability and its impact on economic growth.

First, in terms of theory, this thesis has

tried to expand the generalizability of the empirical
findings which have been found in Sub-Saharan African
countries to other developing systems,
Central and Latin American countries.
and Fosu

(1992)

including Asian,
Since Mbuka (1992)

empirically demonstrated the impact of

political instability on economic growth in Sub-Saharan
African countries,

I expected to find empirical results

which demonstrated the impact of political instability on
economic growth in other developing countries; thus this
thesis could make more generalizable relationship between
political instability and economic growth.

However, the

statistical result does not support my hypothesis.

Given

the conceptual and operational definitions and the result
of multiple regression analysis, there is no statistical
relationship between political instability and economic
growth in developing countries.

Consequently, this the-
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sis proves the

efficiency of

the

middle

range

theory

which applied to only certain geographical areas.
This thesis attempted to employ a different configu
ration of the conceptual definition of political insta
Government duration has been used in the study

bility.
of

developing

However,

countries

as

described

in

Chapter

in terms of consistent policy making,

III.
I ex

pected that the government duration concept could be ap
plied to every country, regardless of whether it is de
Contrary to studies on devel

veloped or underdeveloped.

oping countries, this thesis could not achieve statisti
cal support for the relationship between political insta
bility, which is defined in terms of government duration,
and economic growth.

In developing countries,

I found

that government duration might not be a useful definition
of political instability.

Rather,

I

found that other

contexts of political instability should be defined.
Cross-sectional

analysis

is

not

quite

appropriate

for searching for the impact of political instability on
economic growth.
preferable.
ever,

we

Rather, longitudinal analysis would be

In order to maximize generalizability, how
need

to

combine

cross-sectional analysis.

longitudinal

analysis

with

It would be better if we cap

ture the impact of longitudinal changes or shifts, and at
the same time obtain enough cross-sectional cases.

Sta

tistically, pooled time-series analysis makes this possi-

This thesis also shows that the proper set of data

ble.

is needed to conduct empirical analysis.

Compared to

economic data, the set of political data is not abundant.
Consequently, although this thesis does not statis
tically confirm the impact of political instability on
economic growth in developing countries,

a consideration

of the possible reasons for this finding can contribute
to the further study of the relationship between politi
cal instability and economic growth by developing more
useful research designs and conceptualizations.
Recommendations for Further Study
I examined various possible reasons for statistical
insignificance

from

the

theoretical

Based on this consideration,

to

methodological.

I recommend the following

strategies for further study of the impact of political
instability on economic growth.

First, it would be bet

ter if more appropriate and possible explanatory vari
ables were considered along with political instability.
Second, in the process of conceptualization, it would be
better if the intuitive and operational definitions of
political instability and other variables were considered
in

terms

Third,

it

analysis.

of representing temporal changes
would

be

better

to

use

pooled

and shifts.
time-series

It would help both theoretically and methodol

ogically in terms of expanding generalizability and not
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losing the degree of freedom.

What kind of research de-

sign may be employed, in this case, is solely determined
by how to conceptualize and operationalize political in
stability.

Even if pooled time-series analysis is a

truly powerful design, as seen in this thesis, when po
litical

instability

is

captured

by

average

number

of

years chief executive remains in office, we cannot assign
pooled time-series analysis.

When I assert that pooled

time-series would be better, I also intend that more re
liable and validated indicators should be employed.

For

example, when we are able to capture and make indicators
for all intuitive definitions of political instability
that Hurwitz (1973) provides, which are existence of vio
lence,

existence of structural change, lack of constitu

tional order, systemic instability and lack of governmen
tal duration,

we could assign various research design

such as pooled time-series analysis and cross-national
analysis in single research.
Fourth, I would suggest that it would be better if
the regime type were considered in the model.
cated in Chapter II,

As I indi

even if a simple relationship be

tween regime type and economic growth has not been con
firmed by various scholars (Przeworski and Limongi, 1995;
Roemer,
variable
growth.

1995) ,

the regime type might be an intervening

between

political

instability

and

economic

For example, if we are surely able to define re-
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gime type for each country,

we can assign make regime

type as a dummy variable and capture the impact of regime
type.
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Appendix A
Sample of Developing Countries
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MADAGASCAR
MALAWI
*MALAYSIA
*MEXICO
*NICARAGUA
*NIGER
*NIGERIA
*PAKISTAN
*PANAMA
PARAGUAY
*PERU
PHILIPPINES
SENEGAL
SIERRA LEONE
*SRILANKA
*THAILAND
TOGO
*TURKEY
*URUGUAY
*VENEZUELA
ZAMBIA
*ZIMBABWE

*ARGENTINA
*BANGLADESH
*BOLIVIA
*BRAZIL
*BURKINA FASO
*BURUNDI
CAMEROON
*CHILE
*COLOMBIA
*COSTA RICA
*ECUADOR
*EL SALVADOR
*ETHIOPIA
*GUATEMALA
*HONDURAS
*INDIA
INDONESIA
IVORY COAST
*JAMAICA
KENYA
*KOREA

*Classified

as

�high'

political

instability

(remainder as �low' political instability)
Mean of Political Instability is 6.86

Appendix B
Correlation Matrix
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Correlation Matrix
Growth of
Capital
Growth of
Capital
Growth of
Labor Force
Growth of
Merchandise
Export

Growth of
Labor Force
.402

Growth of
Merchandise
Export
.185

.035
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